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Abstract
Background: China issued strict nationwide guidelines to combat the COVID-19 outbreak in January 2020 and
gradually loosened the restrictions on movement in early March. Little is known about how these disease control
measures affected the 600 million people who live in rural China. The goal of this paper is to document the
quarantine measures implemented in rural China outside the epicenter of Hubei Province and to assess the
socioeconomic effect of the measures on rural communities over time.
Methods: We conducted three rounds of interviews with informants from 726 villages in seven provinces,
accounting for over 25% of China’s overall rural population. The survey collected data on rural quarantine
implementation; COVID-19 infections and deaths in the survey villages; and effects of the quarantine on
employment, income, education, health care, and government policies to address any negative impacts. The
empirical findings of the work established that strict quarantine measures were implemented in rural villages
throughout China in February.
Results: There was little spread of COVID-19 in rural communities: an infection rate of 0.001% and zero deaths
reported in our sample. However, there were negative social and economic outcomes, including high rates of
unemployment, falling household income, rising prices, and disrupted student learning. Health care was generally
accessible, but many delayed their non-COVID-19 health care due to the quarantine measures. Only 20% of villagers
received any form of local government aid, and only 11% of villages received financial subsidies. There were no
reports of national government aid programs that targeted rural villagers in the sample areas.
Conclusions: By examining the economic and social effects of the COVID-19 restrictions in rural communities, this
study will help to guide other middle- and low-income countries in their containment and restorative processes.
Without consideration for economically vulnerable populations, economic hardships and poverty will likely continue
to have a negative impact on the most susceptible communities.
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Background
China’s government issued nationwide guidelines to
combat the COVID-19 outbreak in January 2020 and,
after implementing strict lockdown measures for more
than a month, gradually loosened the restrictions on
movement in early March. These guidelines mandated
social behaviors that were designed to prevent the
spread of infection and were implemented by local
health organizations [1]. Public service sectors, such as
hospitals and schools, underwent major changes to ac-
commodate these new guidelines [2]. In cities across the
country, flights and train travel were limited, public
events were cancelled or postponed, and schools were
closed until further notice [3]. The rollout of these mea-
sures coincided with China’s Lunar New Year holiday—a
time when a majority of the population returned to their
homes to celebrate with family. In early March, as
COVID-19 began to abate in all major city centers (with
the exception of the Wuhan/Hubei epicenter), the re-
strictions on movement were gradually loosened. Con-
trols on travel were lifted, and public transportation was
resumed [4–6]. Schools in urban areas started to reopen
in April [3].
Multiple studies were conducted on the effect that the
COVID-19 restrictions had on employment in urban
areas and found that most workers were still able to
work from home during the quarantine. One study that
used survey data from 64 cities shows that less than 2%
of urban workers lost jobs [5]. Although approximately
25% of urban workers were not able to work as a result
of the outbreak, measures were put in place by the local
and national government to ensure that salaried workers
in urban centers could not be laid off during this time
[5]. China’s national government also implemented nu-
merous incentives for large businesses in urban centers
in an effort to achieve their goal of a quick economic
recovery.
In addition to maintaining high employment rates,
urban centers worked to mitigate the effects of these
regulations on student learning by utilizing online learn-
ing and parental support. Research suggests that, al-
though schools were uniformly closed in cities during
the quarantine, urban children received online inter-
active instruction from teachers with support from par-
ents [7]. Apart from livestreaming classes, the Ministry
of Education worked with urban schools to develop an
online learning platform to allow more than 50 million
students and teachers to simultaneously connect and
interact [8]. The supervision of urban parents also has
been shown to play an important role in the success of
in-home educational outcomes, as parents partnered
with schools to support the autonomous learning
process [9]. In urban schools, online teacher training
also was made available (and often mandated); the
training covered best practices for teaching online and
how to navigate a variety of devices, and suggested the
appointing of teaching technology consultants to
minimize disruptions of technological errors [7]. Quality
technology infrastructure and adequate network cover-
age, as well as familiarity with (and availability of) a var-
iety of devices, made the shift from in-person to online
learning relatively seamless in urban centers [7].
Unlike the straightforward transition to online learning
seen in education, urban healthcare centers were faced
with the challenge of accommodating a surge of resi-
dents who were seeking medical attention, all while shel-
tering in place. City hospitals faced an overflow of
patients, particularly in the Wuhan epicenter, and had to
turn away urban residents. To accommodate the over-
crowding of medical centers, temporary hospitals, or
fangcang, were erected in public spaces, such as commu-
nity centers and public halls [10]. Research revealed that,
for the majority of the urban populations, telemedicine
and contact tracing were effective solutions to monitor-
ing and slowing the spread of COVID-19 in major urban
centers [11]. Using high-speed internet, the telemedicine
system proved to be an effective tool in educating people
about the virus as well as diagnosing, treating, and pre-
scribing medicine to urban residents from their homes
[12].
To help urban residents to cope with COVID-19, the
government implemented various economic measures to
keep businesses afloat and to mitigate income loss and
unemployment. To minimize layoffs and offset income
loss, financial institutions were encouraged to lend to
small businesses through tax incentives [13]. In addition,
relief measures were implemented in the form of tax ex-
tensions, which could be accessed via tax bureau web-
sites and mobile applications. These extensions covered
everything from real estate tax exemptions to social se-
curity payment deferrals [13]. To maintain employment,
firms were not permitted to lay off salaried employees
[14]. For those urban residents who were not covered by
the employment guarantees, programs were imple-
mented by the government to ensure that they were able
to maintain a basic income. These programs not only
simplified the unemployment application process but
also extended the amount of time urban laid-off workers
could receive unemployment benefits [15].
Although we have a body of literature that has allowed
the world to study and follow the impacts on China’s
residents in urban areas, there are still unanswered ques-
tions about how COVID-19 effected the 60% of the
Chinese populace in rural communities [16]. What were
the disease control measures, and how were they imple-
mented in rural villages, especially those outside the epi-
center of Hubei Province? What were the effects on
employment, health care, and education? To what extent
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did the government provide aid to low-income families
who, with no public safety net, were one of the most vul-
nerable subpopulations in China? Answers to these
questions are important for not only understanding the
welfare effects on rural communities, which make up
more than half of the Chinese populace, but also the
ability of rural residents to find employment, to continue
learning, and to receive health care in the aftermath of
the pandemic. These factors will play a key role in
China’s overall economic recovery and future growth.
The goal of this paper is to document the quarantine
measures implemented in rural China outside the epi-
center in Hubei Province and to assess their socioeco-
nomic effect on rural communities over time—both
during the time that disease control measures were be-
ing strictly implemented and after their loosening. By
examining the economic and social effects of the
COVID-19 restrictions in rural communities, this study
will help to predict China’s ability to recover economic-
ally as well as guide other middle- and low-income
countries in their restorative processes.
Methods
Study design and participants
For this study, starting in late February 2020, we re-
cruited village informants who took part in previous un-
related studies conducted by the research team. The
previous studies covered 2069 villages in 540 townships
across 60 counties in seven inland provinces: Ningxia,
Shaanxi, Gansu, Jiangxi, Henan, Yunnan, and Sichuan.
Together, the seven provinces account for over 25% of
China’s overall rural population [17]. On average, the in-
come per capita of rural residents in these provinces was
1683 USD in 2018 (ranging from 1127 USD per capita
to 2185 USD per capita), slightly below the national
rural average of 2209 USD per capita [18].
To select a sample for this study, we first included all
540 townships. Within each sample township, we cre-
ated a list of 10 randomly selected households and ex-
cluded individuals who lived in the local urban centers
or county seats, leaving only those households in rural
villages. We also excluded village officials, village doc-
tors, and village teachers to ensure that our sample con-
sisted of ordinary villagers. Finally, we made phone calls
to the households on the list to complete the interview,
with the goal to include 100 villages per province. In
total, we randomly selected and interviewed 726 village
informants, who resided in 726 randomly sampled vil-
lages. The sampling approach is summarized in a flow
chart (Fig. 1). The number of counties, townships, and
village informants for each province are listed in Table 1.
We estimate that about 726,000 rural residents were
represented in the sample villages.
The data presented in this paper were collected from
three rounds of phone call surveys. The first round of
the survey was conducted in late February 2020, when
we interviewed all 726 village informants. In late March,
prior to conducting second-round survey (approximately
1 month after the first round), we randomly selected 349
of the village informants who had completed the first
round of survey. There were village informants from
each county in the sample (on average, 6 village infor-
mants per county). The third round of survey took place
in late April, and during this survey, we interviewed the
remaining 371 of the village informants who had not
been interviewed in late March. In total, 34 informants
(out of 726 informants in total) had left their respective
village for work by the time we conducted the second-
and third-round surveys. We asked these 34 informants
to refer us to a friend or family member who still lived
in the village. Carried out in this way, there was little at-
trition in the second and third rounds of the survey.
Data collection
During the three waves of the survey, we conducted
three rounds of phone-call surveys to collect data from
village informants during and after the quarantine. Each
phone survey lasted approximately 1 h. During the sur-
vey, enumerators asked the village informants to
characterize the nature of the quarantine and the conse-
quences of the quarantine measures for the village as a
whole. We informed village informants that their ano-
nymity would be maintained and that they could answer
the survey questions freely.
Each round of the survey questionnaire contained five
sections. The first section collected information on the
quarantine measures that were implemented, including
transportation limitations, travel restrictions, and other
rules, both within the village (that were implemented by
local village leaders) and those taken by the government.
The second section collected information about
COVID-19 infections and deaths in the village and in
the surrounding townships. The third section of the sur-
vey asked about the general effect of the quarantine on
employment and income. The fourth section of the
Fig. 1 Flowchart of sample selection
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survey asked about the effect of the quarantine on the
accessibility of education for rural students and about
the nature of (non-COVID-19) health care in the village.
The final section of the survey asked the village inform-
ant to describe how the national and local governments
attempted to address negative consequences of the quar-
antine on rural villagers.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive analysis was performed to compare the
trends of control measures and effects reported by vil-
lage informants. All analyses were done using Microsoft




In February, China’s government implemented a number
of strict quarantine measures across nearly all of the na-
tion’s rural villages outside the epicenter (Table 2).
Movement was restricted, with 87% of village informants
who reported that they could not visit friends or family
in other villages and 65% who reported that they could
not leave their villages for shopping. Not only were vil-
lagers prevented from going on walks in 72% of the vil-
lages surveyed, but children were not permitted to play
freely outside in 88% of the villages. Of the village infor-
mants, 96% reported that wearing a mask was
mandatory to go outside, although only 16% of infor-
mants reported that surgical masks were readily available
for purchase in their villages. Group activities were more
strictly enforced than the movement of villagers: 99% of
villages surveyed did not permit group entertainment ac-
tivities, 98% did not permit weddings or funerals, and
97% did not permit villagers to visit other homes within
the village.
Restrictions on movement were loosened in March
and April (Table 2, Columns 2 and 3), but restrictions
on mask wearing and group activities were maintained.
In March, only 17% of village informants reported that
their villages continued to ban visits to family or friends
in other villages, with just 8% of informants who re-
ported the same in April. During this period, only 0.3%
of villages surveyed did not permit residents to leave the
village for shopping. Similarly, restrictions on going for
walks dropped to 14% of villages surveyed in March and
then to 6% in April. By late April, only 16% of villages
did not permit children to play freely outside. However,
restrictions remained high on mask wearing, with 89%
of village informants in March and 76% in April who re-
ported that their village still required them to wear a
mask to leave their homes. The availability of surgical
Table 1 Sample distribution






Avg. distance from village to
county seat




Gansu 5 62 107 42.95 90 99
Ningxia 20 103 103 25.44 304 41
Shaanxi 11 99 105 39.70 168 100
Jiangxi 3 58 101 24.04 439 100
Sichuan 4 95 107 37.05 317 99
Henan 6 46 101 14.88 606 100
Yunnan 11 77 102 48.15 229 76
Total 60 540 726 33.17 308 88
Table 2 COVID-19 disease control measures reported in rural villages
Control measure February N = 726 March N = 348 April N = 371
Visits not permitted from family or friends who live outside of the village 87% 17% 8%
Villagers not permitted to leave the village for shopping 65% 0.3% 0.3%
Villagers not permitted to go for walks 72% 14% 6%
Children not permitted to play freely outside 88% 21% 16%
Villagers required to wear masks to go outside 96% 89% 76%
Surgical masks available for purchase 16% 74% 97%
Group entertainment activities not permitted 99% 66% 50%
Weddings or funerals not permitted 98% 74% 55%
Villagers not permitted to visit other homes within the village 97% 53% 44%
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masks, though, improved greatly over the availability in
February, with masks available for purchase in 74% of
villages in March and 97% of villages in April. Restric-
tions on group activities also were maintained. By the
end of April, 50% of villages surveyed continued to pro-
hibit group entertainment activities, 55% prohibited
weddings and funerals, and 40% prohibited villagers
from visiting and gathering neighbors.
Infection rate and deaths
The three rounds of surveys revealed a low rural infec-
tion rate and zero deaths due to COVID-19 in sampled
rural communities (Table 3). Only four of the 726 village
informants reported COVID-19 infections in their vil-
lages in February. In total, there were only 10 individuals
who were reported as being infected. One villager was
reported as infected in two of the villages, two infections
were reported in the third village, and six infections were
reported in the fourth village. No further infections were
reported in the March and April surveys. The sample of
726 villages represented about 726,000 rural residents, of
whom 10 were infected. To the extent that our sample is
representative of rural communities outside of the epi-
center, this means that the implied infection rate for
rural areas outside of Hubei Province was 0.001%. There
were no COVID-19 related deaths reported in any of the
villages for any of the three waves of the surveys.
To verify that the number of infection/death cases of
COVID-19 that were reported by the village informants
in the sample villages were valid, we crossed-checked in-
formation with official infection numbers released by na-
tional-, provincial-, and city−/county-level authorities.
The cases reported by the four village informants in our
sample were consistent with the official records.
Employment and income
The initial February survey revealed widespread negative
effects of the quarantine measures on employment in
rural areas (Table 4, Column 1, Rows 1 to 5). Of the vil-
lage informants, 74% reported that villagers had stopped
working due to workplace closures. Travel to urban cen-
ters also was difficult, with 82% of village informants
who reported that local public transportation had ceased
operating and 64% who stated that villagers who owned
vehicles were not permitted to drive themselves to cities.
In addition to the issue of accessing transport to their
urban destinations, 94% indicated that, within cities,
rural individuals would not have been permitted to rent
living quarters. Even if travel and accommodation were
not issues, 67% of village informants stated that the fear
of infection in their villages was so great that villagers
did not want to leave the village to find employment.
Although most of the quarantine measures that were
keeping villagers from returning to work were lifted in
early March, the March and April surveys revealed con-
tinued high levels of unemployment in rural areas (Table
4, Columns 2 and 3, Rows 1 to 5). By late March, only
5% of village informants reported an inability to use
public transportation, and 2% reported restrictions on
driving to cities. In addition, by late April, only 4% of in-
formants reported restrictions that prevented rural
workers from renting living quarters in cities. Despite
the removal of these policy-erected barriers, village in-
formants reported that 40% of villagers who worked last
year were still not able to work in late March and that
31% of villagers were still not working by late April.
Moreover, fear of infection continued to deter villagers
from traveling to find work in 30% of villages in March
and 22% in April.
High unemployment coincided with lower incomes
and higher prices, with little aid from the government,
leading rural villagers to cut daily expenditures (Table 4;
Figs. 2 and 3). Village informants reported that income
had decreased in 92% of villages in February, 82% in
March, and 91% in April (Table 4, Row 6). In addition
to lost income due to unemployment, 42% of village in-
formants reported that rural workers who returned to
work in April received decreased wages (Fig. 2). During
this time period, prices rose drastically, with 63% of vil-
lage informants who reported in February that the prices
of common goods had increased from last year and 66%
who reported the same in March and April (Table 4,
Row 7). Moreover, most villagers did not benefit from
government relief, with only 20% of village informants
who reported the existence of relief programs in their
villages by late April (Rows 8 to 10). Of those that who
receive government relief, 11% of villages reported that
few villagers received small financial subsidies (500
RMB, equivalent of 127 USD); 11% of village informants
said that there were families in their communities who
Table 3 Effects of disease control measures on the spread of COVID-19
COVID-19 spread February March April
Diagnosed patient in village 4/726 (0.55%) 0/348 0/371
Number of diagnosed patients per villagea 2.5 (4.85–7.85) 0 0
Infection rate 10/726000 (0.001%)b 0 0
Note. Data are mean (95% CI) or n/N (%)
aReported by four village informants
bCalculation based on 1000 villagers per village
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received daily necessities, such as rice, oil, and seeds. As
a result, villagers coped by cutting their expenditures on
daily necessities (Fig. 3). In April, 63% of village infor-
mants reported that residents of their villages spent less
on food, 19% reported less spending on health care, and
14% reported less spending on education.
Education
Village informants reported pervasive disruptions to
regular schooling as well as various efforts over time by
teachers and policymakers to mitigate these disruptions
(Table 5, Rows 1 to 5). In the villages surveyed, no
schools had been reopened in February or March, and
only a quarter had reopened by late April. During the
time that schools were closed, however, the proportion
of local teachers who assigned daily homework to stu-
dents increased from 69% in February to 91% in April.
Among these teachers, the proportion who regularly
graded homework and provided feedback rose from 83%
in February to 96% in April. In addition, the ratio of
schools that organized online learning climbed from
71% in February to 89% in April.
Despite the efforts made to mitigate learning disrup-
tions, our data also show that there were factors that al-
most certainly limited the quality of online learning in
the rural communities. For example, numerous online
classes were not taught by local teachers, meaning that
online instructors were teachers with whom students
were unfamiliar. These teachers also may have taught
the curriculum at a pace which was faster than rural
schools could keep up with. Non-local teaching was
60% in February and changed to 37% in March and
28% in April (Table 5, Row 5). During the online
classes, although 75 and 95% of students in February
and April were able to see their teachers in online
classes, only 19% of teachers in February and 33% in
April could see their students (Row 6). Around 90%
of students used phones to connect to online classes,
whereas less than a fifth used computers (Rows 7 and
8). The proportion of those who used television to
tune into educational broadcasts was consistent, at
around 41% (Row 9). The percentage of village infor-
mants who reported that students in their communi-
ties suffered from internet connectivity issues rose
from 68% in February to 78% in April, to the extent
that roughly a third of students had to stay outdoors
to maintain reception (Row 10). Moreover, village in-
formants reported numerous problems that they be-
lieved disrupted the quality of online learning (Fig. 4).
In April, 60% of village informants mentioned that
there was less discussion between students and
teachers, 58% noted that no one monitored student
learning, 48% indicated that students did not listen
carefully in class, 54% stated that nobody guided stu-
dents with homework, and 28% noted that there were
other family disturbances. These factors contributed
to the increasingly negative feelings toward the im-
pact of control measures on the education of local
children, from 79% in February to 84% in March and
91% in April (Table 5, Row 12).
Table 4 Reported effects of COVID-19 disease control measures on employment and income




Villagers unable to work because workplaces were closed 74% 40% 31%
Villagers unable to use public transportation to travel to city 82% 5% 2%
Villagers unable to drive or carpool to the city 64% 2% 0.1%
Villagers unable to rent a place to stay in the city 94% 10% 4%
Villagers decided not to leave the village to work due to fear of infection 67% 30% 22%
Villagers reported income decreased 92% 85% 91%
Prices of common goods were higher than last year 63% 66% 66%
Villages that received local government relief N/A 17% 20%
Villagers received financial subsidies N/A 9% 11%
Villagers received daily necessities N/A 10% 11%
Fig. 2 Percentage of village informants who reported an increase,
no change or decrease in wages after work resumed
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Health care
Most villages reported that health care remained access-
ible during and after quarantine (Table 6, Rows 1 to 3).
In February, 71% of the village clinics were open daily.
After the quarantine, the share of village clinics that re-
ported being open daily increased to 91% in March and
then 98% in April. Almost all of the village informants
reported that they were able to leave the village to seek
health care in February during the strictest period of the
quarantine (95%) and after the easing in March (84%)
and April (96%). Medicines were reported to have been
generally available in most of the sample villages during
the quarantine in February (89%) and after the quaran-
tine in March (90%) and in April (98%).
Although health care was generally accessible, about
20% of the village informants reported that people had
delayed seeking routine health care due to COVID-19 in
March (Table 6, Rows 4 to 6). Later in April, the number
of villagers who delayed their health care due to
COVID-19 decreased to around 11%. Few villagers re-
ported being aware of telemedicine services in March
(4%) and April (3%). Overall, 62% of the village infor-
mants reported a negative impact of COVID-19 on




The findings of our surveys suggest widespread enforce-
ment and compliance with quarantine measures across
rural China during and after the quarantine period. In
February, virtually no village informants reported being
Fig. 3 How villagers coped with decreases in income in April
Table 5 Reported effect of COVID-19 disease control measures on education
Effect February March April
School in session 0/726 (0%) 0/348 (0%) 91/371 (25%)
Mitigating efforts by school districts
Local teachers assigned homework for students daily 500/726 (69%) 302/348 (87%) 337/371 (91%)
Local teachers corrected homework for students daily 415/500 (83%) 284/302 (94%) 325/337 (96%)
Schools organized online courses 513/726 (71%) 304/348 (87%) 329/371 (89%)
Challenges for rural students learning online
Online courses were not taught by local teachers 307/513 (60%) 117/320 (37%) 91/329 (28%)
Teacher could not see video of students during online courses 413/513 (81%) 240/304 (79%) 210/329 (67%)
Devices students used to get online
Phones 437/513 (85%) 280/304 (92%) 318/329 (97%)
Computers 81/513 (16%) 58/304 (19%) 103/329 (31%)
Televisions 212/513 (41%) 131/304 (43%) 130/329 (40%)
Internet connection were often not stable 350/513 (68%) 232/304 (76%) 256/329 (78%)
Students needed to go outdoors to maintain connection N/A 92/304 (30%) 52/325 (16%)
Reported negative effect on education 570/726 (79%) 293/348 (84%) 337/371 (91%)
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able to move freely or gather in groups. Even with the
lifting of restrictions in March, village authorities
remained cautious and kept in place certain measures
throughout April. For instance, approximately half of the
rural villages surveyed in April still did not permit group
activities, with 44% of villages that banned visiting neigh-
bors from playing cards. Children also were not allowed
to play freely outside in about a sixth of villages surveyed
in April. These restrictions were kept despite virtually
no increase in China’s COVID-19 case count throughout
April [19].
The high level of compliance with quarantine mea-
sures in rural areas reflects the capacity of China’s gov-
ernment to impose and enforce community restrictions.
In this way, the efforts in rural China were much like
those in urban China, where local health administrative
departments were in charge of implementing strict quar-
antine measures [1]. In the case of rural areas, village in-
formants explained that village party committee
members, doctors, and village volunteers worked to-
gether as “epidemic prevention and control teams” to
enforce quarantine measures, such as mask wearing [20].
Everyone who went in and out of the village had to
register at a station where body temperature was
checked. As is evident from our survey data, the
widespread compliance of rural communities is likely
due to the presence of strong local government organi-
zations and communication. The enforcement of similar
quarantine measures is likely not possible in most other
middle- and low-income countries, where strong and
widespread local governments are lacking.
Infection rate and deaths
Our surveys demonstrate that strict quarantine measures
throughout rural China coincided with low infection
rates and indicate that likely no widespread cover-up of
COVID-19 cases occurred. Only 10 cases were reported
in total in our February survey, and were all isolated and
treated in designated hospitals. No village informant re-
ported any deaths from the virus. The implied infection
rate in our sample area was about 14 infections for every
1 million people. This infection rate aligns with the offi-
cial rate of 11 infections per million people reported for
all areas of China (except for Hubei Province).
One key question, of course, is whether the informa-
tion from the village informants was accurate and truth-
ful. We believe so for three reasons [21]. First,
information generally spreads quickly in villages in
China [22]. Despite restrictions on physical movement
in villages, nearly ubiquitous mobile phone and social
Fig. 4 Problems that disrupted the quality of online learning, as reported by village informants
Table 6 Reported effect of COVID-19 disease control measures on health care
Effect February March April
Villagers were able to see a doctor outside of village 687/726 (95%) 291/348 (84%) 355/371 (96%)
Village clinic was currently open 516/726 (71%) 315/348 (91%) 362/371 (98%)
Villagers were able to buy medicine 645/726 (89%) 313/348 (90%) 362/371 (98%)
Villagers chose to delay health care due to COVID-19 N/A 68/348 (20%) 39/371 (11%)
Villagers knew how to use online doctors/telemedicine N/A 14/348 (4%) 12/371 (3%)
Negative impact on health care 62% 45% 44%
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media use would have allowed news of infection cases to
spread quickly [23]. If an infection were present in a vil-
lage, relatives and neighbors in the village would cer-
tainly have known. Second, to our knowledge, there was
no attempt to keep infections a secret from residents.
Rather, informants described how village authorities
made efforts to ensure that all village residents were
aware of infections through methods such as loud-
speaker announcements and large banners. Finally, dur-
ing the interviews, the research team’s enumerators
unilaterally stated that almost all village informants were
willing to openly share with us their knowledge of infec-
tions in their villages.
Were the strict quarantine measures responsible for
the low levels of infection in rural communities outside
the epicenter? In the absence of counterfactual informa-
tion, it is not possible to know for certain whether the
disease control measures described in the previous sec-
tion are directly responsible for the low rural infection
rates in our sample. Although we do not have causal
data between strict control measures and the limited
spread of COVID-19 in rural areas, our survey demon-
strates that the two events coincided with one another.
When considering this in conjunction with the experi-
ence of nations such as the United States, Brazil, and
India, where fewer control measures were accompanied
by greater virus spread [24], it is highly likely that the re-
strictive and widespread control measures indeed re-
sulted in the reported low infection rates.
Employment and income
The implementation of quarantine measures resulted in
a radical increase in unemployment in China’s rural
areas that persisted even 2 months after the measures
were relaxed. Nearly three-quarters (74%) of rural
workers outside of Hubei Province who were employed
a year ago were unemployed in February as a result of
workplace closures and layoffs related to COVID-19.
Our surveys show almost one-third (31%) of all rural
workers were still unemployed in late April.
Such high levels of unemployment stand in stark con-
trast to the unemployment rates announced in China.
As a result of the pandemic and subsequent control
measures, China’s official unemployment rose by less
than 1%, from 5.3% in January to a peak of 6.2% in Feb-
ruary [25]. Even though the rate of 5.9% (as of May
2020) was higher than pre-pandemic levels, the slight
overall change implies that the effect of the quarantine
measures on China’s economy was insignificant, and it
would seem to be likely to completely recover. It is im-
portant to note, however, that China’s reported un-
employment rates applies only to urban areas and has
always excluded rural residents and seasonal migrant
workers [26], the same groups who did not receive
protection from layoffs during the pandemic. As a result
of this omission, rural unemployment is largely over-
looked. Thus, our surveyed unemployment rate differs
greatly from the official rate and shows that nearly one
out of three (31%) rural workers who had jobs in 2019
were still not working as of late April, suggesting that
quarantine measures were having a larger, long-term
negative effect on China’s economy than what official
figures reveal.
What are the factors that influence the high rates of
unemployment? Apart from workplace closures and lay-
offs related to COVID-19, rural workers also could have
ceased working due to transportation difficulties. Fear of
infection (which was still a deterrent in a fifth of the vil-
lages in April) played a significant role in villagers’
decision-making processes (see Additional file 1), result-
ing in an unemployment rate even higher than our esti-
mates. Another likely factor that contributed to the high
rural unemployment rate was weak domestic and inter-
national demand as China’s consumers coped with lost
wages and other countries coped with the global reces-
sion [27, 28], leading the nation’s factories to continue
operating at lower capacity and hiring fewer workers (at
lower wage rates). Rural unemployment/income is,
therefore, likely to remain high as demand stays low and
workers struggle to find jobs, resulting in unused human
capital and hindering China’s economic recovery.
Disaggregated data on the rate of economic recovery
that has been published in the literature support the
findings in this study of the slow recovery that is being
borne in no small part by rural workers. A March survey
by Peking University, with data from over 1 million en-
terprises, showed that job listings for lower-salaried
workers (below 4000 RMB per month) dropped by 44%
compared to the same time last year [29]. In contrast,
the drop in postings for jobs that were in the higher sal-
ary range (> 15,000 RMB) was only 12%. This finding
validates the results of our survey and suggests that the
recovery has been slower for low-wage workers, the ma-
jority of whom are rural and did not enjoy protection
from layoffs.
The high economic toll of the high rural unemploy-
ment rate due to COVID-19 is evident when considering
the amount of lost wages of rural workers during and
after the quarantine period. In normal times, China has
288 million migrant workers who leave their counties
for extended periods to work in distant cities and an
additional 93 million workers who live in their villages
but work within their own counties [17]. Together, these
two populations of rural workers amount to 381 million
people. According to our data on unemployment due to
workplace closures, it is assumed that 74% of these
workers were unemployed in February, 40% in March,
and 31% in April. Rural migrant workers make an
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average of 560 USD per month [30], but they are paid
only if they work. Altogether, this means that the lost
wages of rural workers over the three-month period
amount to at least 309 billion USD. This value for lost
wages does not even account for the lower wages re-
ceived by 42% of rural workers who had returned to
work by April. In comparison, the highest estimate for
the global economic cost of the SARS outbreak in 2003
was only 100 billion USD [31].
Although rural Chinese residents likely bore the brunt
of the negative economic effects of the quarantine, they
have received little assistance from the government. Ac-
cording to the literature and official reports, there have
been a number of government relief measures that have
benefited urban areas, including subsidies for key enter-
prises, extensions on tax payment deadlines, and emer-
gency loans to qualifying firms [13]. This is despite the
fact that government incentives for companies allowed
urban salary-earning workers to continue to be paid,
protected from layoffs, and able to rely on strong social
support programs if needed [32]. In contrast to the
widespread government aid that urban areas received, by
April, only 20% of village informants reported that their
villages had received any government relief. A mere 11%
of the villages surveyed received any financial subsidies,
which averaged only about 127 USD—not even a quarter
of a migrant worker’s average monthly salary [30]. An-
other 11% of government relief measures distributed ne-
cessities, such as rice, oil, disinfectant, and seeds, but it
likely had little long-term impact on the financial situ-
ation of village families.
Without supplemental income from government re-
lief measures, the multiple months of lost wages will
likely have long-lasting effects on rural households. In
rural China, the average monthly income of a migrant
worker is 560 USD, while the per capita monthly dis-
posable income of a family that relies fully on farm-
ing is only 190 USD [30, 33]. Thus, with prolonged
high unemployment and decreased income for rural
migrant workers, it is expected that rural households
have lost (and will continue to lose) a large portion
of their annual income. Coupled with the increased
price of common goods, households have been forced
to cope by cutting back spending on daily necessities,
such as food and health care. The decrease in food
expenditures in 63% of surveyed villages is particu-
larly concerning because it is likely that rural families
replaced relatively expensive meats and fruits in their
diets with grains and starch, resulting in less dietary
diversity and possible micronutrient deficiencies. Rural
children already face high levels of anemia from poor
nutrition; thus, these additional nutritional deficien-
cies could worsen this issue and negatively affect chil-
dren’s long-term educational outcomes [34]. It is
apparent that quarantine measures could have long-
lasting negative effects on rural families.
Education
Our results show that, despite nationwide efforts to miti-
gate learning disruptions, the quarantine may have had a
negative impact on the educational outcomes of rural
children. China is one of the few countries where the ex-
istence of internet connectivity in remote rural areas
made long-distance learning a practical possibility dur-
ing the quarantine [35, 36]. Nevertheless, internet con-
nectivity and infrastructure issues were a major barrier
for many. Many households also did not have appropri-
ate electronic devices for online learning. Instead, a large
share of students had to use phones for online learning,
and few used computers. Finally, parental assistance in
learning often was not seen in rural communities. More
than half of the village informants reported that no one
monitored rural students when they learned or tutored
them regarding homework, and they found that these
problems disrupted the quality of online learning. Fur-
ther, unlike our employment results, where efforts to
mitigate unemployment were ongoing throughout the
quarantine, we found little improvement in our results
on education over time. Because roughly 423 million
students across urban and rural China learned online for
at least 2 months during school closures, it is likely that
access to quality online learning will continue to play a
major role in determining educational outcomes [37].
Our study also demonstrates that the negative impact
of the quarantine on education had a number of barriers
to learning. For example, under quarantine measures,
there appears to be a severe lack of teacher-student
interaction. Teacher-student interactions have been
shown to be essential for student learning [38, 39]. On-
line classes are sometimes led by teachers who have
never met their students previously, so those teachers
are unable to accurately determine the learning nuances
of each student, and, therefore, the effectiveness of their
interactions would likely decrease. When local teachers
were teaching, they could not even see students in their
online classes, which impedes teacher-student interac-
tions through video calls. As a result, about a half of the
students in our survey turned to asynchronous learning
by watching educational television broadcasts, for which
students were told to tune into a specific channel to
watch pre-recorded lecture videos. Research has shown,
however, that pre-recorded online instruction has zero
or even negative effects on learning, which poses an add-
itional challenge to educational growth [38, 40].
Although the low levels of teacher-student interactions
are naturally associated with online, in-home learning,
our data show that there were other issues, such as those
related to family, that put rural students at a greater
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disadvantage. Family disturbances might even have ac-
tively harmed the children’s education. Most rural
grandparents, and even some rural parents, have limited
educational attainment and are not sufficiently familiar
with online learning technologies. This greatly limits
their ability to help their children with online school-
work [41, 42].
When comparing the experience of rural students to
students from urban areas in the provision of online, in-
home learning, it is almost certain that the COVID-19
pandemic has further widened the rural-urban education
gap. As discussed in the first part of this paper, urban
students likely maintained quality in-home learning that
resulted from greater access to suitable learning devices
and parental supervision [9]. To the extent that the
smoother and more supported efforts in urban schools
compared to the experience of rural students (as shown
in this paper), there is no reason to think that the in-
equalities in rural-urban schooling have diminished dur-
ing the winter and spring of 2020.
Health care
The good news is that most villagers in rural China had
access to health care during and after quarantine.
Throughout the 3 months in our survey, almost all vil-
lagers were able to leave the village to seek health care.
Moreover, even during the quarantine period, most vil-
lage clinics were open. By the end of the quarantine
period, almost all clinics were back in operation. During
and after the quarantine, medicine remained accessible
for purchase.
Despite the accessibility of rural health care, recent re-
search in China that focuses on the quality of rural
health care suggests that the benefits of the severe quar-
antine measures and the associated low rates of infection
cannot be overestimated. Village and township doctors
in rural areas have been shown to misdiagnose and mis-
treat patients at startlingly high rates [43]. Although
diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19 would likely have
been better given higher levels of awareness, a healthcare
system staffed by poorly trained clinicians suggests that
the rural healthcare system would have been ill-prepared
to handle a large-scale outbreak. As such, it is fortunate
that the infection rates were low in rural communities.
Although the rural healthcare system did not break
down during or after the quarantine, the health of rural
residents was still negatively affected due to villagers’
choosing to delay their health care. Even after quaran-
tine measures were lifted, 11% of villagers still chose to
delay their health care. If we assume a similar rate across
all rural populations in China, that means that, even 2
months after the quarantine was lifted, there are still 61
million people who delayed their health care. This could
lead to many serious health complications other than
COVID-19 [44]. The delay of health care may have been
due to COVID-19 measures, which include restrictions
on travel and fear of infection. Indeed, over time, when
the pandemic became less severe, more people decided
to seek medical care. Research has documented the same
pattern of delayed health care in urban China [45, 46].
Conclusion
According to our survey of 726 randomly selected rural
villages during and after the strict COVID-19 quarantine
measures were enforced, these measures likely aided the
containment of infection in rural China, resulting in a
low infection rate. Nevertheless, there were very high
costs for rural areas under quarantine. A sharp increase
in rural unemployment persisted for nearly 2 months
after the measures were relaxed, suggesting that the rate
of economic recovery was not as clear and rapid as
China’s government indicated. Although transportation
and rental restrictions were largely lifted by March, there
were fewer employment opportunities due to lower de-
mand inside and outside of China. In addition, rural
workers in some villages were reluctant to leave their vil-
lage and return to work due to fear of infection. Few
state government relief measures have been directed at
the rural populace, and with the reportedly rising prices
of common goods and nearly 2 months of lost income,
rural households had to cut down on food and health
expenditures.
Beyond the effects on employment, the virus affected
villagers in other ways. Although local governments and
school systems have made great efforts to minimize dis-
ruptions to learning by implementing online classes, pol-
icymakers have largely neglected the inaccessibility of
the internet infrastructure in rural villages, household
electronic devices, and educational software in rural re-
gions. There were also many families who reduced their
expenditures on health care, an act that has had a cost
that, to date, has not been measured.
The pandemic should induce China to put more effort
into the healthcare system in rural communities. The
poor quality of rural clinicians could have left rural areas
ravaged if the infections had spread to rural communi-
ties. Indeed, the strict quarantine measures in rural
China prevented an epidemic in rural areas where pri-
mary care would be largely ineffective against surges in
case numbers. In preparation for the next outbreak, ef-
forts to improve China’s rural healthcare system, par-
ticularly in primary care, could be critical to thwarting
catastrophic effects on rural populations in the future.
As COVID-19 continues to spread throughout the
globe, our findings are increasingly relevant for other
low- and middle-income countries. Workers around the
world face huge losses of income in the coming weeks
and months. As governments implement quarantine
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measures, they must also consider the needs of econom-
ically and socially vulnerable communities or face dra-
matic increases in economic hardship and poverty
among the hardest hit.
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